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 1   Introduction and global climate change 
Today’s environmental issues are very complex and often have a global dimension. Global 
environmental change concerns such diverse areas as acid rain, biodiversity, climate 
change, depletion of stratospheric ozone, hydrological processes and global fisheries and is 
underpinned by anthropogenic processes as for example demographic change, 
urbanisation, economic development and growth, industrialisation, expansion of the global 
tourism industry or changes in land use. Often there are complex interrelationships 
between the key drivers of these changes in which business plays a role both influencing 
and being influenced these processes and their outcomes. Therefore, the corporate sector 
(and in the remits of this paper in particular European firms) is pivotal in many ways for 
sustainable development and there is considerable agreement, even between business and 
governments that global co-operation across nations is required in order to implement 
effective policies towards sustainable development (e.g. WBCSD 2002). Some of the 
processes of change have been tackled early as for example acid rain (which was for 
example the focus of government measures in Germany in the 1970s and indeed marked 
the birth of German environmental policy) or ozone depletion which was addressed by the 
Montreal Protocols and where there is evidence that firms with a proactive stance on the 
issue even benefited economically (Albrecht 1998a, b). However other issues, and 
especially global climate change still remain largely unsolved, mainly due to the fact that 
policy making has only very limited experience in dealing with long run environmental 
problems under a high degree of uncertainty. 
One of the most important global environmental issues is global climate change due to 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from various sources. The atmospheric 
concentration of warming gases, so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs)
1 increased by 30 per 
cent since the industrial revolution started (Mabey et al. 1998). This is suspected to be due 
to human activities and might cause an environmental problem that is global in scope and 
will have impacts that stretch over centuries and because of this sometimes is seen as a 
man-made global geophysical experiment. Considerable damage could be caused by the 
potential indirect impacts of global warming as for example changes in precipitation, in 
vegetation cover or in soil moisture and the consequent effects on agriculture or possible 
increases in tropical storms and a rise in sea level (Mabey et al. 1998). 
The major anthropogenic sources of the GHGs at the root of the problem are on the one  
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hand coal, oil and gas combustion and on the other hand deforestation and land use 
changes. The equivalent carbon dioxide concentration today is twice the level of pre-
industrial times. In early simulations using General Circulation Models (GCM) a doubling 
of the carbon dioxide equivalent concentrations of GHGs resulted in an increase of the 
global mean surface air temperature of 1.5 to 4.5 °C, with a best guess estimate of 2.5 °C 
(IPCC 1992). Under these scenarios, a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations was 
predicted to occur between 2030 and 2040 and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) had recommended a stabilisation of carbon dioxide at a concentration of 
450 ppm to avoid further global warming (IPCC 1992)
2.  
The Third Assessment Report of the IPCC has meanwhile concluded that global emissions 
could be reduced below year 2000 levels by 3.6-5.5 bn tonnes by 2020 and that half of 
these reductions are achievable cost-effectively, due to the considerable technological 
progress achieved in the last decade with regard to GHG-relevant technologies (Metz et al. 
2001). Based on these updated parameters, modelling predicts for carbon dioxide 
concentration to stabilise at 450-550 ppm until the end of this century (Metz et al. 2001). 
Achieving this target however requires significant societal changes worldwide, which also 
imply significant changes in the corporate sector in Europe, particular with regard to firms’ 
energy management strategies. 
Due to its large emission levels and a long lifetime in the atmosphere, carbon dioxide still 
contributes most to the greenhouse effect. The main source of global GHG, and in 
particular carbon dioxide emissions is the combustion of fossil fuels to generate energy. 
Currently international co-operation to influence and stabilise global climate change is on 
its way to being institutionalised within the Framework Convention for Climate Change. 
After an introduction to the FCCC and a discussion of the different strategic options for 
business responses of European industry (in terms of corporate energy management 
strategies) to address climate change, the paper outlines the economic issues surrounding 
TEP systems and the structure of the European emission trading system and analyses likely 
implications of the system on European industry. It then discusses implications of a gene-
rally positive view of TEPs from a theoretical perspective and a rather critical assessment 
by industry of the recent EU emissions trading directive. The paper concludes with general 
observations on the economic aspects of international co-operation and optimal climate 
policies. 
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2   The UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (FCCC) 
To date, the FCCC is the only multilateral agreement on GHG and especially carbon 
dioxide reduction that has been both, agreed and enforced. The major aim of the FCCC, 
according to its Article 2 is “to achieve (…) stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system” (UNEP 1992). Therefore it obliges the countries listed in Annex I of 
the convention
3 in Article 4.2.b to start controlling their GHG emissions “with the aim of 
returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (…)” (UNEP 1992). Due to the voting rules of 
the Global Environmental Facility
4 a group of 24 countries, amongst them the G7 
economies, will determine the amount of GHG abatement in the short and medium term. 
This especially concerns the money transferred to developing countries and any further 
binding targets for these 24 countries themselves (Mabey et al. 1997). These 24 nations 
account for 43 per cent of the global fossil fuel derived carbon emissions. Within this so-
called ‘Annex II group’, the G7 economies account for approx. 38 per cent of these 
emissions. All countries that belong to the Annex I group produce 66 per cent of the global 
fossil fuel based carbon emissions. 
According to Greene (1993) the transition of the FCCC to a treaty with significant targets 
will take some time and is likely to be based on consensus rather than on legal obligation. 
On the other hand, to develop the FCCC into a true global treaty is a prerequisite to 
overcome the problem of carbon leakage that is caused by energy market responses and 
industrial relocation and which hinders for example the implementation of tradable 
emission permits (Mabey et al. 1997). The Berlin meeting of the Conference of Parties 
(CoP) in 1995 resulted in the ‘Berlin Mandate’, a declaration of intent that set a deadline of 
1997 for negotiating a protocol or other binding legal instrument to cover the commitments 
of the developed countries after 2000 (Jepma and Munashinge 1998). It also set up a 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice to provide scientific and technical 
information and made the Convention Secretariat permanent on January 1st, 1996 in Bonn. 
From the point of real-world progress the most important result of the Bonn meeting 
probably was the agreement on a pilot phase for joint implementation until 2000. After a 
second CoP-meeting in Geneva in 1996, at the third Conference of Parties (CoP 3) to the 
FCCC in Kyoto in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, agreeing to include three 
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flexibility mechanisms (Joint implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) nad emissions trading between countries) in the Protocol to the FCCC (Joint 
Implementation Network 1998). Article 3 enacts this in allowing Annex I Parties to 
subtract certified emission reductions or emission reduction units from their assigned 
amount of emission reductions during the commitment period. Joint Implementation (JI) is 
allowed for co-operation between Annex I Parties and between Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties. In this, Article 6 of the FCCC covers this first type of JI whereas the second type is 
covered in Article 12 of the Protocol, which defines the Clean Development Mechanism 
(Joint Implementation Network 1998).
5 Whilst CoP 4 and CoP 5 in Buenos Aires and 
Bonn, respectively were mainly focussed on procedural aspects, CoP 6a/b in 2000/2001 in 
Den Haag and Bonn arrived at a number of decisions with particular relevance to the 
corporate sector. These included agreements on the role of carbon sinks in the framework 
of CDM, limitations to ‘hot air’ GHG reductions, compatibility of different types of 
emission certificates and credits as well as on details of emissions monitoring and 
reporting. At the CoP 7 meeting in Marrakesh many of these agreements were finalised 
and operationalised and also it was agreed on including emissions from air and naval 
traffic which again is of relevance to the corporate sector (BMU 2001; 2003). One main 
objective resulting from CoP 7, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol until the CoP 8 
meeting at the Rio+10 conference in Johannesburg was however not achieved. Also, it 
seems unlikely that, after the recent CoP 9, held in December 2003 in Milan, Russia as the 
most important state for the Kyoto Protocol will change its position, and in doing so would 
enable quick ratification (also see Grubb and Safonov (2003) for a more detailed analysis 







                                                 
5 The purpose of this CDM is to support non-Annex I countries through projects set up in co-operation with 
Annex I Parties. The latter may use certified emission reductions from such projects to meet their targets. 
Emission reductions are measured by novel entities set up by the CoP. Credits are allocated for reductions 
achieved during the period between 2000 and 2012 (Joint Implementation Network 1998). Next to JI and 
CDM, emission trading is the third Kyoto mechanism to be discussed in detail later. 
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3   The success of the FCCC to date 
According to Mabey et al.  (1997), one precondition for global sustainability (i.e. 
preservation of ecosystem stability) are nearly constant atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs. The IPCC (1992) estimated that a 50 – 70 percent reduction of GHG emissions 
(based on 1990 emission levels) would be necessary to stabilise the carbon dioxide 
concentration at 450 ppm. However, none of the cost benefit analyses on climate change 
carried out to date have concluded that it would be possible to economically reduce 
emissions more than 20 percent (Mabey et al. 1997). Therefore, carrying out only cost-
efficient counteraction and abatement measures will likely not achieve the aforementioned 
stable concentration levels. Although the FCCC contains a precautionary principle in 
Article 3.3, it also stipulates that any policy measures to halt global climate change must be 
cost-effective and take into account economic issues, which points to a trade-off between 
the ecological and economic efficiency of the convention. Partly as a result of this, most 
GHG emission reductions to date did not directly attribute to the FCCC. Any reductions in 
the former-Socialist economies of transition in Central and Eastern Europe are mainly due 
to the rapid decrease in industrial production in these countries. Similarly, German 
compliance with the FCCC to date is to a large degree caused by the German unification 
and the subsequent breakdown of large parts of the industrial base in the former German 
Democratic Republic (Bergius 2003). In the United Kingdom (UK), a large part of 
emission reductions can be attributed to the fuel-switching processes (from coal to gas) 
that resulted from the deregulation of the British energy sector. Therefore only a small part 
of the reductions to date can be related directly to the FCCC. Also, recent analyses of 
progress towards their Kyoto targets in the most important member countries of the FCCC 
reveal that often GHG emission in several countries do not even move in direction of their 
Kyoto targets (BMU 2003, p. 413). For example, emissions in the U.S., Japan and Canada 
have grown, instead of falling, and within the EU, only the UK, France, Sweden, Finland 
and Luxemburg have reached their reduction targets but, as the example of the UK shows 
this may only partially be a result of the FCCC. From these results the notion may arise 
that the FCCC is rather to confirm the global recognition of the importance of climate 
change issues but not an effective instrument, for which one precondition would be 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
7 This should not be regarded as a failure though, since 
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long-run GHG emission levels depend as much on the final atmospheric GHG 
concentrations achieved, as on the choice of the emissions time-path (Richels and 
Edmonds 1995). Given that both together determine the ultimate costs of stabilisation the 
results of the FCCC to date probably indicate that more attention needs to be paid to 
identifying those paths that minimise the costs of achieving a specific target as the specific 
design of any stabilisation agreement can greatly influence the potential acceptability and 
stability of that agreement. However, slow progress on the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol (and the global emission trading systems proposed to become active between 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol from 2008 onwards) has led the European Union (EU) 
as early as March 2000 to propose a closed European emission trading (ET) system that 
shall also form the basis for Kyoto-based inter-country ET from 2008 onwards (EC 2000; 
Klinski 2002). This was detailed in a draft EU directive on GHG emissions trading 
between firms in October 2001 (EC 2003) which was ratified by the European Parliament 
in late summer 2003 after the second reading of the directive in the parliament. This 
means, that at the beginning of 2005, a tradable emission permit system will be in place in 
the EU which permits trading between firms. This of course raises the issue of how 
emission trading affects the corporate sector in particular in the EU which is the focus of 
the remainder of the paper. Any analysis here needs to start with the broader strategic 
frame for energy management strategies. 
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4   Corporate energy management strategies to address 
 climate  change 
Generally, there are three strategies for the corporate sector to address climate change by 
means of energy management whilst at the same time not jeopardizing other central 
business objectives (such as earnings satisfizing or profit maximization). These are: 
improvement of energy efficiency, an increased use of renewable energies, fuel switching 
and the use of flexible mechanisms (such as JI, CDM or ET).
8 
The first of these strategies, improvement of energy efficiency, has been on the agenda for 
quite some time, initially triggered by the 1970s oil crises and recently predominantly 
because of increasing energy taxes. Unfortunately two factors limit the scope of this 
strategy. Firstly this is that because of its considerable history, energy efficiency 
improvements through direct measures (such as process integration, combined heat and 
power, heat and steam recovery) at plants or sites have often reached a level that leaves 
limited scope for cost-efficient improvement, since frequently the process-related limits are 
very close. Secondly, market imperfections such as lack of information hinder even cost-
efficient investments in energy efficiency (Jaffe and Stavins 1994a, b; Sanstad and 
Howarth 1994; Sutherland 1996). Hence the potential for energy management-based GHG 
reductions by means of increased energy efficiency seems to be most viable in countries 
with low efficiency levels in energy generation and utilisation such as India, the U.S. and 
the post-socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe or China rather than in the EU. 
Despite of this, new technologies bear some additional potential in the EU as well. For 
example, the specific energy consumption of thermal processes is expected to decrease by 
30% due to novel membrane technology to replace thermal processes. Especially in the 
consumer market segment of the electricity industry considerable potential also exists for 
demand-side based energy management strategies such as Demand Side Management 
(DSM) or Least-Cost Planning (LCP) which were also found not to penalize energy 
suppliers pursuing them in financial terms (Greening 1995). 
For the second of the strategies mentioned earlier, increased use of renewable energy tech-
nologies and sources, or more generally for fuel switching, the longer-term potential is 
high, since it leads to direct GHG emission reductions. Particular potential here exists for 
countries with a fossil-fuel intensive energy mix and for renewable energy technologies. 
One example of a technology with significant potential are solar cells. 
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Solar cells are increasingly used, but substantial progress with multi-layer solar cells is 
expected only between 2013-2023, when cell efficiencies in excess of 50% (resulting in an 
increase of module efficiencies from 14-17% to over 20%) and a share of renewable 
energies of around 10% are forecasted (Butz 2002). Firms such as BP Solar and Shell Solar 
have already vertically integrated solar cell manufacturing operations. However, at the 
moment, Japanese firms such as Sharp or Kyocera pursue the most aggressive market 
expansion strategies which may however be slowed down due to a lower level of vertical 
integration. This shows, that currently activities in the EU in the field of solar cells are 
mainly driven by large multinational energy companies, renewable energy-focussed 
companies and EC research programs. However even conservative market forecasts (Butz 
2002) predict a market of approx. 600 MWp of solar cell production (with optimistic 
predictions expecting more than 1000MWp) at least part of which will also be a promising 
field of activity for SMEs within the EU as is shown by companies such as Enercon, 
Repower or Vestas. As can be seen from Table 1, market forecasts imply considerable 
growth rates and at the same time an increased technological diversity (e.g. in terms of a 
significantly reduced market share of mono-crystalline solar cells which today dominate 
the market) which also requires novel forms of cooperation within industry. This 
development is already spearheaded by the recent joint ventures such as the one of German 
firms SolarWorld and Degussa who intend to jointly set up a pilot plant for the production 
of solar cell silicon in Antwerpen by 2005 (Anon 2003; Iken 2002).  
 
Table 1: Market forecasts for the world solar cell market 
Year World  market 





World market CAGR 
(cumulative annual growth 
rate) 1999-20xy 
1999 201  35%  (1997:  49%)  0% 
2001 390-400  30%  25%-26%  (calculated) 
2010 conservative  600  15-20%  2.5%-9.5% (estimated) 
2010 optimistic  1450  15-20%  12%-18% (estimated) 
(Source: Butz 2002; SAM 2002; Franken 2003) 
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For companies in the EU corporate sector, renewable energies will only be a viable energy 
or fuel source (and thus an element of their corporate energy management strategies), if 
they can compete on price with fossil fuel-based technologies. This would require prices to 
fall from currently around 3-4$/Wp to around 1.5$/Wp by 2010, which can only be 
achieved by means of significant innovation efforts not only of cell and module technology 
but also associated manufacturing processes. As a note of caution and a remainder that 
such radical innovation is not a ‘free lunch’, Grubb (1997) points to the relevance of early 
(government supported) PV innovation activities and associated induced innovation 
benefits which may require more systematic market support in order for renewable energy 
technologies to become a competitive energy source in the soon-to-be fully liberalized and 
deregulated EU energy markets.  
Finally, a third general strategy for corporate energy management to address climate 
change-induced demands is the use of flexible mechanisms such as JI, CDM and ET which 
are the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and which have been introduced in Section 2. 
Whilst CDM and JI enable European industry to exploit marginal abatement cost 
differences between countries, its incentives for early action are comparatively low. There 
is for example uncertainty regarding the use of emission reduction units or emission credits 
from JI/CDM in the EU emissions trading system with the current status being that such 
use is possible from 2008 onwards, provided the Kyoto Protocol will be ratified until then. 
Hence, whilst early JI/CDM projects may have positive reputation effects for firms, they 
run the risk of gaining only limited economic benefits. At the same time such projects, 
usually requiring multi-partite partnerships have internal risks due to their complexity. 
Limiting these also increases costs. For example, De Gouvello et al. (2003) show in their 
analysis of the Tahumanu Project in Bolivia, that it is an important success criterion to 
analye the incentive situation of all participants in a CDM project. 
As another option, a combination of any two basic energy management strategies 
discussed so far is perceivable, e.g. joint use of renewable energies and JI/CDM. Here, it 
would be possible for EU companies to use renewable energies at sites which are eligible 
for JI/CDM, e.g. in Asia, Africa or India with the possibility for gaining credits or 
reduction units from GHG reductions. This seems to be of particular interest given the 
current focus of EU firms on expanding business in Non-Annex I countries. For example, 
new plant construction in Asia could focus on integrating CDM activities already during 
the planning stage which may reduce the construction costs or offset increased emissions 
in the EU. With the imminent accession of several Central and Eastern Europe states to the   10   Marcus  Wagner 
 
 
EU such a scenario would also be possible on the basis of JI for business expansion in 
Eastern Europe. Several renewable energy technologies can be a pillar for such projects, 
but in particular in Africa, the potential of PV is significant. This example also shows, that 
joint strategies based on renewables and JI/CDM are also able to integrate economic, social 
and ecological demands into business activities and is hence highly suitable for increasing 
sustainability amongst European industry.  
Next to JI and CDM, ET is a third flexible mechanism. Prior to describing the EU sys-tem 
and discussing its practical implications of for EU firms and its energy management 
strategies, the theoretical basis for such a system shall be recapitulated briefly. 
   Firms, the Framework Convention on Climate Change & the EU Emissions Trading System  11 
 
5   An economic assessment of tradable emission permit 
  systems as a basis for ET  
Climate change is a problem to be solved between nation states, therefore it lacks an 
existing legal framework within which property rights and contractual enforcement allow 
classically defined actions to take place (Mabey et al. 1997). The atmosphere has no owner 
and therefore no ownership rights are defined. In this case property rights are not complete 
and external costs and benefits may not be internalised. The atmosphere will therefore not 
be used at socially optimal levels which equates to market failure. In order to correct 
market failure, access rights have to be defined through collective agreements. Otherwise, 
the fate of such an open access resource is likely to be degraded due to ‘free-riding’ 
(Hardin 1968), despite of the fact that perfect co-operation could avoid this, since it is a 
stable outcome (i.e. a Nash equilibrium) of the open access management game provided a 
number of assumptions are fulfilled (Mabey et al. 1997). 
The economic rationale that underpins tradable emissions permits (TEPs) is that by 
creating markets for environmental goods, property rights can be defined and the negative 
externality of carbon emissions becomes a ‘normal’ market good. Whereas with carbon or 
energy taxes the price is controlled directly, with TEPs the amount of GHG emissions is 
controlled directly, but prices only indirectly (Endres 1994). Therefore permit systems 
offer more security in reaching pre-defined environmental targets and provide a safer route 
to securing the corresponding benefits. At the international level TEPs would be a way to 
avoid international carbon taxes which is seen as their major political advantage (Eyre 
1997). As well the U.S., who strongly reject carbon taxes, have already implemented 
permit systems for sulphur dioxide emissions in some states, and may be more open to 
tradable permits for carbon emissions despite the fact of the current government opposing 
to the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol in general. Unfortunately, TEPs are to some degree hin-
dered by several theoretical issues, as for example the problem of how to setting the overall 
emission cap, whether initial allocation of permits should be based on ‘grandfathering’ or 
if a TEP system should include a ‘borrowing’ clause (Endres 1994).
9 With the TEP system 
recently adopted by the EU (hereafter referred to as the EU emissions trading (ET) 
system), a first system is currently implemented for inter-firm (as opposed to intra-firm) 
trading of carbon dioxide emissions. This system shall be introduced in the following and 
its implications for European industry and its energy management activities shall be 
discussed. 
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6  The EU emissions trading system and its implications for the 
  European industry and corporate energy management 
 activities   
The EU ET system applies only to combustion installations with a net heat supply in 
excess of 20 MW, such as industrial power stations, furnaces and other plant in the che-
mical industry, the energy generation industry, oil refineries, steel smeltering in the 
manufacturing industry, the ceramics industry and the cellulose, paper and board ma-
nufacturing industries. In total, the 4500 installations that are in the scope of the ET 
legislation emit ca. 46 % of the EU’s total CO2 emissions (Bergius 2003; Klinski 2002). 
According to the EU ET directive, only carbon dioxide emissions are affected, but no other 
GHG emissions. For the former, inter-firm trading is possible, with the system boundary 
being the individual installations of a firm which are within the scope of the directive. The 
directive defines initially two trading periods, the first from the beginning of 2005 to 2007 
and the second from 2008 to 2012. The national implementations of the directive are 
subject to approval by the EU. Industry in Europe was initially very critical of the proposed 
directive and was favoring, next to demanding a number of amendments, voluntary agree-
ments between government and industry as an alternative to any TEP (see BDI (2001) for a 
critical position typical for German industry). The EU ET directive was amended to make 
a number of concessions to these criticisms which included voluntary pooling of credits in 
the first trading period as well as the possibility of an opt-out (non-participation in the ET 
system) during the first trading period.
10 Over the period until final adoption of the direc-
tive, the position of the corporate sector towards the ET directive has become more diverse 
in that some firms have taken a more proactive stance and acknowledged the possibility of 
benefits through trading as well as limited competitive disadvantages from the system 
(Döhmel 2003). Whilst general agreement on the EU ET system was (despite of initial 
reservations of EU industry, a relatively easy task) a tight timeline now complicates 
implementation of the system in the EU member states.  
For example, in Germany alone 2500 to 3000 installations are affected by the new EU di-
rective. In Germany, initially, emissions data of the relevant installations for 1990, 1998, 
2001 and 2002 was collected in late 2003 and early 2004. Then, the national allocation 
                                                 
10 Whilst the concessions were at the forefront geared towards addressing criticisms by European industry, 
they at the same time included requirements which made it very unlikely that industry would make use of 
them. Limitations existed in that reporting duties of firms still (even with pooling or opting-out) referred to 
individual installations which threatened cooperation within individual industries as well as any incentives 
for voluntary agreements since these would relief firms of their monitoring and reporting duties. Also, firms 
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plan was developed by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment based on a top-
down allocation of emission allowances to macro-level economic sectors. This macro-level 
allocation was combined with the aforementioned bottom-up analysis of the current 
emission data for the affected firms at the end of 2003 and in the beginning of 2004. The 
final national allocation plan for Germany was then submitted to the European Commiss-
ion (EC) in March 2004 for approval of the national implementation of the directive based 
on the national allocation plan and then became binding law in Germany. This last step 
again required several administrative adjustments concerning legal clarification of key 
terms (such as ‘installation’ for which in Germany already precise legal definitions exist 
which need to be harmonized with the requirements of the EU ET directive), as well as 
clarification of how an emission permit for an installation relates to existing operating 
permits for installation and which authorities (e.g. federal or state-level ones) are to 
administer the new laws. These issues implied that national legalization of the directive 
was a demanding process in Germany and that the additional structures may result in 
inefficient administration.  
Country-level issues are further aggravated by general problems due to e.g. an unspecific 
definition in the EU ET directive of what an installation is.
11 At the EU level an issue of 
particular relevance for the directive is to which degree the novel Accession Countries will 
participate in the system. The current trend is that except for Hungary and Poland all other 
Accession Countries will participate from 2005 onwards in the EU ET system. Given that 
these countries will most likely be strong sellers in the system, the issue is to which degree 
insufficient EU-wide harmonisation will distort competition in the EU and whether this 
would constitute a breach of other EU legislation, requiring the EC to take action.  
EU industry is mainly affected by five issues resulting predominantly from the tight imple-
mentation schedule of the directive. Firstly this is the fact, that the guidelines for for-
mulating the national allocation plans and for monitoring are to be published (according to 
a schedule suggested by the EC) shortly before the national plans have to be submitted to 
the EC. This means that firms will not have much chance for a response to the guidelines 
so that the national plans will likely go unaltered to the EC.  
Secondly, the limited data base for derivation of the national allocation plans could easily 
lead to a misguided allocation of emission credits to the different macro-sectors This may 
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combustions plants are affected which burn waste air, solid or liquid waste but are in parallel fuelled with 
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put EU industry at a disadvantage since they likely have more comprehensive and more 
reliable data available than e.g. the transport sector where difficulties arise in data 
gathering due to the non-point source characteristics of most emitters. 
Thirdly, the degree to which early actions are taken into account in the allocation of carbon 
dioxide emission certificates under the EU directive is a critical factor. If early actions are 
only taken into account to a very limited degree, then the burden will be put to a larger 
degree on environmentally proactive firms, which carried out emission-reducing activities 
early since for them, it will be more costly to reduce emissions further. This essentially 
represents a double burden for such firms, since also their early emission-reducing 
activities may have put them at a cost disadvantage compared to competitors.  
As a forth aspect, the current approaches to allocation are not very well-structured, which 
may result in cross-subsidiaries from the industry macro-sector to other macro-sectors 
(traffic, households, or in the case of Germany an emission credit ‘reserve’ for replacing 
nuclear fuel-based power stations with gas- or oil-based ones as part of the current 
government’s energy policy). Building such ‘reserves’ as a result of a complex allocation 
process will reduce the emission reserves of the corporate sector for increasing industrial 
production and may essentially limit economic growth or introduce competitive 
disadvantages compared to unaffected world regions. As addressed in Section 5, allocation 
procedures are also pivotal to the overall efficiency of the ET system.
12 
Fifth and finally, the corporate sector may be faced with increased administrative costs for 
certification, monitoring, reporting, permit processing and trading of certificates, 
depending how efficient the directive is implemented by the member states.
13 
Next to tradable emission permit systems such as the EU ET system, voluntary or nego-
tiated agreements are discussed or applied as alternatives or complements.
14 A particular 
case in question here is Germany. Trautwein (2002) names as one reason why in Germany 
tradable emission permit systems are not much developed the voluntary agreements of the 
corporate sector with the government on carbon dioxide and GHG emission reduction 
targets (Buttermann and Hillebrand 2002; Buttermann et al. 1999). Based on these targets, 
specific industries such as e.g. the German chemical industry have set their own targets. 
For the German chemical industry, this requires a reduction of their GHG emissions by 45-
50% until 2012 on the basis of 1990 emission levels which equals a reduction of 41 million 
                                                 
12 Buttermann and Hillebrand (2003) discuss this in more detail. 
13 Gouldson and Murphy (1998) analyse in detail efficiency aspects of implementing regulation. 
14 Wu and Babcock (1999) provide a very detailed discussion of various aspects of voluntary programs.   Firms, the Framework Convention on Climate Change & the EU Emissions Trading System  15 
 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents, of which until 1990 21 million tonnes have been 
realized (VCI 2001). Based on specific industry targets, in turn individual companies have 
often set their own targets. It needs to noted, that voluntary or negotiated agreements 
between industry and government are partly put under pressure by the EU ET system. 
Business associations (such as e.g. the German BDI) argue that the EU ET system is to be 
viewed as a substitute system to any voluntary or negotiated agreement. This argument is 
frequently picked up by member firms so that there is a risk that voluntary or negotiated 
agreements are not considered to be binding anymore when the EU ET trading system 
comes into operation. Whilst initially this may be considered as a drawback in countries 
where voluntary agreements are in place between the corporate sector or specific industries 
and the government (such as Germany or the Netherlands), it should not be an issue in the 
long-term, since TEPs in general are designed to achieve defined environmental targets 
and, if executed properly, should therefore achieve emission reductions with more 
certainty. However, as Buttermann and Hillebrand (2003) warn, there is no absolute 
certainty about the reductions achieved, since macroeconomic factors which are difficult to 
predict (such as currency exchange rates or unexpectedly warm or cold years) may have a 
significant effect. They therefore suggest parallel use of CDM and JI as specified in the 
Kyoto Protocol in order to ensure sufficient flexibility of the EU ET system. 
What becomes apparent from the theoretical analysis of TEPs in general and the develop-
ment of the EU ET system to date is that the rather positive assessment of TEPs from a 
theoretical perspective is complemented by a rather critical assessment of industry of the 
recent EU emissions trading directive. This is despite of the considerable potential for 
firms in particular in the industrial to utilize emissions trading as part of their corporate 
energy management strategy and strategic responses towards climate change. In particular 
once the Kyoto Protocol comes into force, a number of novel strategy options open up for 
EU industry e.g. in combining business strategy-based market expansion plans with JI or 
CDM activities to be used within the EU ET system. Next to these direct win-win relations 
between economic and environmental and social objectives which could enable the EU 
industry to address the challenge of sustainability in a more integrated way whilst at the 
same time creating a more positive link between the environmental and economic 
performance of individual firms, there are also important secondary effects which are not 
yet fully understood yet. For example, as Rennings (2003) points out, emissions trading is 
likely to become a key instrument in the future co-ordination of environmental and 
innovation policy in the EU and expects strong innovation impacts from the application of   16   Marcus  Wagner 
 
 
this novel instrument which according to him however depend much on the chosen 
environmental targets. Given this expanded relevance of ET beyond its direct role in the 
energy management strategies of industry, the final section of this paper shall therefore put 
the instrument in the broader context of optimal climate policies. 
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7  An outlook on economic issues of international co- 
  peration: ET in the context of optimal climate policies as a 
  basis for global environmental policy-making  
In the field of climate policy, one has to distinguish economic factors that drive interna-
tional negotiations to limit GHG emissions and the process of legal and institutional re-
gime building that takes place for example within the UN Framework Convention. Eco-
nomic research to date (and the mere existence of the FCCC) show that co-operation can 
yield large global benefits (Clarke et al. 1993). Following Mabey et al.. (1997), co-
operation shall be defined as a solution between countries that includes a negotiated 
agreement, which is codified in a treaty that is valid under international law. It is well-
known from economic theory that perfect co-operation will always maximise the sum of 
global welfare
15, in other words, full collaborative effectiveness of negotiations to control 
climate change maximises global welfare into the future. However, a workable concept of 
global welfare is difficult to derive because of the non-comparability of preference choices, 
the disparities of income between different countries and the unknowable preferences of 
future generations. For example, as climate change might have a non-marginal impact on 
critical environmental goods, although the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of future generations 
to avoid this change is unknown, it is possible that it will be higher than the WTP of 
current generations to prevent such damages. Also many costs of climate change are not 
priced in the market and in this case substitutability cannot be derived from economic 
analyses but is left to public choice (Mabey et al. 1997). This difficulty in determining the 
substitutability between man-made and natural capital leads to significant problems in 
determining discount rates and future prices. An issue at the micro-level is that perfect co-
operation would imply that each country internalises the full external costs of climate 
change. In this case, a country would reduce its emissions to the level, where its marginal 
cost of abatement equals the marginal global benefits of these emission reductions. Due to 
the aforementioned fundamental problems in economic analysis it is however very difficult 
to determine correct values for these marginal costs and benefits, which is probably one of 
the reasons why international co-operation has not developed as far as it could have in 
theory. To overcome all these difficulties and to improve co-operation, Mabey et al. (1997) 
suggest the application of the two supplementary ethical criteria of intra-generational 
equity and inter-generational equity which would transform the problem from one of full 
welfare optimisation into one of constrained optimisation and would also bring it more in 
                                                 
15 Assuming, amonst other things, that no country involved has decreasing marginal utility of income.   18   Marcus  Wagner 
 
 
line with sustainability objectives (such as proposed in Pearce et al. 1989). In this extended 
perspective, ET is assigned an important role in increasing flexibility of any institutional 
arrangements, as well as enabling a better integration of (economic, social and 
environmental) sustainability aspects at the firm level. 
According to Jepma and Munasinghe (1998) a flexible climate change response strategy 
should include a portfolio of mitigation, adoption and other options, based on the co-
ordinated application of a variety of market-based, regulatory and other instruments, as e.g. 
carbon/energy taxes or TEP systems. Currently tradable emission permit systems seem to 
be a more suitable instrument to extend the current state of joint implementation in the 
FCCC than carbon or energy taxes. Attention should be paid to technology development 
and dissemination, which should as well form part of a climate policy portfolio. A crucial 
issue in this regard is the timing of abatement. This concerns technology and systems 
availability and development and the wide spectrum of technologies both currently and 
potentially available and the spectrum of processes by which such technologies may be 
developed and incorporated in energy systems. Grubb (1997) stresses, that this is a 
complex issue with some factors favouring deferral and others favouring early reductions 
in emissions. However, he makes the point for approaches that favour steady abatement 
efforts exploiting low cost measures to deter new carbon intensive investments and to 
stimulate development and diffusion of low carbon technologies and infrastructure through 
market incentives. He stresses that these might well have the same (or even lower) overall 
costs as strategies, which first concentrate on research and then achieve much abatement in 
very short time. Rennings (2003) expects strong innovation impacts from the application of 
ET, which according to him however depend much on the chosen environmental targets. 
He stresses the pivotal role of targets in any TEP or ET system, in particular with regard to 
any innovation-inducing effects of ET. Naoki (1997) in this respect proposes the inclusion 
of past policy-based efforts and to this end suggests the rate of change of carbon dioxide 
emissions per GDP since 1973 as one of the indicators for targets in future protocols and 
agreements. He points out that any new protocols should provide a framework for 
substantial progress in the real world today, which seems to be a suitable benchmark for 
evaluating future climate policy. Overall, the conclusion of this paper is that ET systems 
are potentially suitable instrument for meeting this benchmark and should thus feature 
prominently in corporate energy management strategies. In the EU, the first steps for 
achieving this are now made with the new ET system.   Firms, the Framework Convention on Climate Change & the EU Emissions Trading System  19 
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